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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
This appeal arises from the district court's final judgment 
in a suit, seeking inter alia, to enforce certain disclosure 
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. SS 77b et seq. (the "Exchange Act"). The facts of the 
case revolve around the efforts of the IBSF Committee to 
Maximize Shareholder Value ("the Committee")-- a group 
of shareholders of IBS Financial Corporation ("IBSF"), a 
New Jersey corporation -- to obtain two seats on IBSF 's 
seven-member board. 
 
In the summer of 1996, some five months before the 
expected date of IBSF 's 1996 annual meeting, the 
incumbent IBSF board reduced the number of board seats 
from seven to six. The board later rejected the Committee's 
nominee for the one open seat, citing the Committee's 
failure to comply with certain provisions of the IBSF 
Certificate of Incorporation. With a view to getting judicial 
ratification of the board's course of action, IBSF in the fall 
of 1996 brought this suit for a declaration that (1) the 
Committee's "Schedule 13D" statement filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") did not 
conform to the requirements of 17 C.F.R. S 240.13d-101, 
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and (2) the board properly rejected the Committee's board 
nominee. Some members of the Committee counterclaimed, 
seeking an injunction requiring IBSF 's board to reinstate 
the board seat it had eliminated.1 The district court, in an 
opinion handed down on January 23, 1997, found in favor 
of the Committee on each issue, ruling that (1) the 
Committee's Schedule 13D statement was complete; (2) 
IBSF was equitably estopped from rejecting the Committee's 
board nominee; and (3) IBSF acted improperly in reducing 
the number of board seats. The district court accordingly 
ordered IBSF to reinstate the eliminated board seat and to 
place two Committee nominees on the ballot at the 
upcoming annual meeting. We will reverse the district 
court's first two determinations, but will affirm the district 
court's determination that IBSF's reduction of the number 
of board seats was improper. 
 
I. Dramatis personae 
 
Identification of the numerous individuals and entities 
that make up the IBSF Committee to Maximize Shareholder 
Value is important to an understanding of the issues in this 
case, particularly the issue of the completeness of the 
Committee's Schedule 13D statement. We will borrow (and 
modestly enlarge, with bracketed inserts) the district court's 
concise description of the principal players: 
 
        [Plaintiff-appellant] IBS Financial Corp. ("IBSF") is a 
       savings and loan holding company owning Interboro 
       Savings & Loan Association ("Interboro"). IBSF 's 
       shares are publicly registered pursuant to the 
       Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. SS 77b et 
       seq. (the "Exchange Act"), and actively traded. 
       Defendants together own approximately 8.5% of the 
       outstanding shares of IBSF common stock. 
 
        Seidman & Associates, L.L.C. (SAL) is a limited 
       liability company managed by Lawrence B. Seidman 
       ("Seidman"). SAL's members are Seidman, Seidcal & 
       Associates, L.L.C. ("Seidcal"), Sonia Seidman ("Mrs. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Other claims and counterclaims were litigated at the district court 
level, but are not before us on appeal. 
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       Seidman"), and two other individuals. . . . Pursuant to 
       SAL's operating agreement, Seidman as managing 
       member has exclusive and broad investment powers. A 
       majority in interest, however, may remove or replace 
       Seidman as managing member with or without cause 
       upon payment of a removal penalty. [A majority in 
       interest also has complete discretion with respect to 
       "[a]ll decisions, consents, authorizations and rights in 
       connection with the business and affairs" of SAL.] 
       Seidcal currently owns a 71.43% interest in SAL but 
       takes no active role in its affairs. 
 
        Seidman & Associates II, L.L.C. ("SAL II") is also a 
       limited liability company managed by Seidman. SAL II's 
       members are Mrs. Seidman and Seidcal. . . . SAL II's 
       operating agreement grants Seidman as manager 
       exclusive and broad investment powers. A majority in 
       interest, however, may remove or replace Seidman as 
       manager with or without cause. [As with SAL, a 
       majority in interest has complete discretion with 
       respect to "[a]ll decisions, consents, authorizations and 
       rights in connection with the business and affairs" of 
       SAL II.] At present, Seidcal owns a 75% interest in SAL 
       II but takes no active role in its affairs. 
 
        Federal Holdings, L.L.C. ("Federal") is a limited 
       liability company managed in part by Seidman. 
       Federal's members are Charisma Partners, L.P. 
       ("Charisma") and nine individuals. [Charisma in turn 
       has one general partner, 8th Floor Realty Corp. ("8th 
       Floor"), whose Vice President is Kevin Moore.] Under 
       Federal's operating agreement, Seidman is investment 
       manager and enjoys exclusive and complete power to 
       buy, sell, and vote Federal's stock. The operating 
       agreement names Kevin Moore ("Moore") administrative 
       manager and clothes him with the authority to make 
       non-investment decisions and remove Seidman as 
       investment manager for cause [until June 13, 1997, 
       and to remove Seidman for any reason thereafter. The 
       agreement makes no provision for removing Moore as 
       administrative manager.] Neither Charisma, 8th Floor, 
       nor Moore takes an active role in Federal's investment 
       affairs. 
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        . . . . 
 
        Seidcal is composed of several members of the Cali 
       family. Brant B. Cali is Seidcal's administrative 
       manager, but Seidcal's operating agreement provides 
       that a majority in interest shall manage and conduct 
       Seidcal's business affairs. According to Brant Cali, the 
       lion's share of Seidcal's funding probably derives from 
       three Cali family "seniors," namely John J. Cali, Angelo 
       Cali, and Ed Leshowitz, who are not themselves Seidcal 
       members but whose children are Seidcal members. 
 
        . . . 
 
        Defendants SAL, SAL II, Federal, . . . [and] Seidman, 
       [among others] . . . comprise an unincorporated entity 
       known as the "IBSF Committee to Maximize 
       Shareholder Value" (the "Committee"). As the name 
       suggests, the Committee aims to maximize the value of 
       their IBSF shares. 
 
IBS Financial Corp. v. Seidman & Associates, L.L.C., 954 F. 
Supp. 980, 983-84 (D.N.J. 1997) (citations omitted). 
 
II. Background 
 
The facts relating to the three dominant issues, and the 
district court's ruling on each of these issues, may be 
summarized as follows: 
 
A. Schedule 13D statement:  In September 1995, the 
Committee filed a "Schedule 13D" statement with IBSF and 
the SEC. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the 
filing of a Schedule 13D statement by "any person who . . . 
is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 
per centum" of a class of equity securities, including a 
syndicate or group acting for the purpose of acquiring such 
ownership, 15 U.S.C. S 78m(d)(3), within ten days of 
acquiring such ownership, id. S 78m(d)(1). The SEC's 
implementing regulations also require, via Instruction C, 
information regarding "each person controlling" a member 
of a group filing a Schedule 13D statement. 17 C.F.R. 
S 240.13d-101 Instruction C. 
 
The Committee amended its initial Schedule 13D 
statement nine times, with the ninth amendment filed 
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December 3, 1996, some three weeks after this litigation 
was commenced. As amended, the Committee's Schedule 
13D statement provides the information required by the 
SEC's regulations, 17 C.F.R. SS 240.13d-1 to -101, with 
respect to SAL, SAL II, and Federal, and with respect to 
Seidman as a "person controlling" SAL, SAL II, and Federal. 
However, no information was provided with respect to 
Seidcal, Charisma, 8th Floor, Moore, or those who may be 
perceived as "controlling" Seidcal, Charisma, 8th Floor, and 
Moore. 
 
The district court, in its January 23, 1997 opinion, ruled 
that the Committee's Schedule 13D recitals were complete, 
because Seidman managed SAL, SAL II, and Federal 
without consulting others, and, indeed, the very purpose of 
establishing each of the three funds was "to create a fund 
for Seidman to invest in financial institutions at his 
discretion." IBS Financial Corp., 954 F. Supp. at 988. 
"Looking to the realities of each organization," the district 
court concluded "that Seidman and not Seidcal controls 
both SAL and SAL II within the meaning of Instruction C." 
Id. at 987. Moreover, "Seidman makes all of Federal's 
investment decisions without consulting Moore or other 
investors . . . . Nor has IBSF alleged that Moore intends to 
remove Seidman or that he uses his authority to do so to 
influence Seidman's investment decisions . . . . Accordingly, 
the court concludes that Moore is not a `controlling person' 
within the meaning of Instruction C." Id. at 988. 
 
B. Committee nominees:  On October 7, 1996, the 
Committee gave IBSF the names of two nominees -- Ernest 
Beier and Richard Whitman -- for the two seats it expected 
to be open at the 1996 annual meeting; when informed that 
only one seat would be open, the Committee selected Beier 
as its nominee for that seat. The Committee also supplied 
IBSF with information purportedly in compliance with 
Article 9.3 of IBSF 's Certificate of Incorporation. 
 
Article 9.3 requires that stockholders' nominations of 
potential members of the board be submitted to the board 
in advance of the annual meeting. Each nomination must 
be accompanied by certain information about the nominee, 
including the information "that is required to be disclosed 
in solicitations of proxies with respect to nominees for 
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election as directors, pursuant to Regulation 14A under the 
Exchange Act." Article 9.3 gives the board the power to 
reject nominations that are untimely or incomplete. If the 
board believes that a submission is incomplete, it must 
promptly notify the stockholder making the nomination; the 
stockholder then may cure the identified deficiencies within 
five days. If the board reasonably determines that the 
stockholder has not cured any material deficiency, the 
board has the power under Article 9.3 to reject the 
nominee. 
 
The Committee's submission of the Beier nomination was 
timely. However, IBSF deemed it incomplete. The problem, 
IBSF advised the Committee on October 31, 1996, was 
that, although the Committee's submission reported that 
"several" of Seidman's clients had given him sole voting 
power as to their shares, the submission did not identify 
the clients. IBSF believed that the identity of the clients was 
required to be disclosed by Regulation 14A of the Securities 
Exchange Act, and therefore was required by Article 9.3 to 
be reported to the IBSF board. The Committee asked for an 
extension of the five-day cure period until November 8, 
1996; the IBSF board granted the request. On November 8, 
in Amendment 8 to the Committee's Schedule 13D 
statement, the Committee disclosed information about 
Seidman's arrangements with one of his clients, Michael 
Mandelbaum. 
 
The Committee did not provide information about 
Seidman's arrangements with his other clients until 
December 3; on that date the Committee submitted a ninth 
amendment to its Schedule 13D statement - an 
amendment found by the district court to complete the 
Committee's required disclosures. But prior to the 
Committee's December 3 filing, IBSF, relying on its 
authority under Article 9.3 of its certificate of incorporation 
to reject nominations "not timely made," brought this suit 
seeking, inter alia, a declaration that it was entitled not to 
recognize the Beier nomination. However, the district court, 
in its opinion of January 23, 1997, "decline[d] to [so 
declare] for two reasons." IBS Financial Corp., 954 F. Supp. 
at 991. First, the district court concluded that because 
IBSF had accepted the Committee's nominations in 1995, 
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allowing IBSF to reject the Committee's "substantially 
similar submissions" in 1996 would be " `unjust in the eyes 
of the law.' " Id. (quoting Miller v. Teachers' Pension & 
Annuity Fund, 179 N.J. Super. 473, 477, 432 A.2d 560, 
562 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 88 N.J. 502, 443 A.2d 714 
(1981). Second, the district court reasoned that the 
Committee's untimeliness had not prejudiced IBSF, since 
the pertinent information had in fact been disclosed, albeit 
belatedly, via the December 3, 1996 Schedule 13D 
amendment. 
 
C. Size of the IBSF board:  In December 1995, the 
Committee attempted to elect two independent directors to 
the then-seven-member IBSF board. When that attempt 
proved unsuccessful, it was generally expected that the 
Committee would again seek two board seats in 1996. In 
July 1996, board member Frank Lockhart, who was one of 
two incumbent directors slated to run for reelection that 
year, announced that he intended to step down; the IBSF 
board thereupon voted to eliminate the Lockhart seat as of 
the 1996 annual meeting, leaving only one seat open for 
election at that meeting. 
 
IBSF 's chairman, Joseph M. Ochman, Sr., and another 
director, Thomas J. Auchter, gave deposition testimony that 
the board acted for three reasons in reducing the board's 
size from seven to six. First, the board thought that its 
work could be performed as well with one fewer member, 
because most of the decisions affecting IBSF -- a holding 
company -- were made by the board of IBSF 's operating 
subsidiary, Interboro Savings & Loan Association. Second, 
the board thought a smaller size would provide more 
flexibility if IBSF should in the future undertake 
acquisitions of other companies. Third, the board wished to 
hinder the Committee's attempt to gain a substantial 
presence on the board. 
 
The district court concluded that the first two proffered 
reasons were "suspiciously pretextual" and that "the third 
rationale for eliminating Lockhart's board seat[was] the 
primary motivation behind the IBSF board's decision." 954 
F. Supp. at 985. Accordingly, the district court granted 
judgment on the Committee's counterclaim and set aside 
the elimination of the seventh board seat. 
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D. District court opinion:  As noted above, the district 
court's opinion of January 23, 1997 (1) found the 
Committee's Schedule 13D filings to be complete, (2) 
declared that IBSF was estopped from rejecting Committee 
nominations for the board, and (3) set aside IBSF 's 
elimination of the seventh board seat. The district court 
also (4) declared that the Committee's Schedule 14Afilings 
were complete, and (5) declared that IBSF could not refuse 
to provide the Committee with a shareholder list. IBSF 's 
appeal challenges only the first three of these rulings. 
 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 78aa, 1331, and 1367; we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of the 
district court's legal determinations and its application of 
legal precepts to facts is plenary; we review the district 
court's factual findings for clear error. See Epstein Family 
Partnership v. KMart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
III. Was there adequate disclosure of individuals or entities 
       "controlling" members of the 13D group? 
 
IBSF argues first that the Committee failed to disclose 
certain information required to be publicly disclosed by 
section 78m(d) of the Exchange Act. This section requires 
that, within ten days of the date a person or group acquires 
beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a class of 
securities, certain information must be disclosed. This 
section "was designed `to alert the marketplace to every 
large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of securities, 
regardless of technique employed, which might represent a 
potential shift in corporate control.' " Hubco, Inc. v. 
Rappaport, 628 F. Supp. 345, 351 (D.N.J. 1985) (citations 
omitted). 
 
The SEC regulations implementing section 78m(d) are at 
17 C.F.R. S 240.13d-1 to -6; and the particular form -- 
Schedule 13D -- on which the disclosure is to be made is 
at 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-101. Schedule 13D specifically 
requires the person or group acquiring beneficial ownership 
of more than 5% of a class of securities to provide seven 
items of information.2 The dispute between IBSF and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. These items, in brief, are: (1) "Security and Issuer"; (2) "Identity 
and 
Background"; (3) "Source and Amount of Funds or Other Consideration"; 
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Committee centers on which people and entities the 
Committee must disclose information about. 
 
Instruction C to Schedule 13D provides in relevant part 
as follows: 
 
       If the statement is filed by a general or limited 
       partnership, syndicate, or other group, the information 
       called for by Items 2-6, inclusive, shall be given with 
       respect to (i) each partner of such general partnership; 
       (ii) each partner who is denominated as a general 
       partner or who functions as a general partner of such 
       limited partnership; (iii) each member of such 
       syndicate or group; and (iv) each person controlling 
       such partner or member. 
 
17 C.F.R. S 240.13d-101 (emphasis added). 
 
IBSF contends that the Committee's amended Schedule 
13D statement was insufficient because it did not report 
information about the persons or entities "controlling" 
certain members of the Committee, which is a "group" 
responsible for filing the Schedule 13D statement. Three 
members of the Committee -- SAL, SAL II, and Federal -- 
are each primarily owned by one other entity: Seidcal 
Associates, L.L.C. owns 71.43% of SAL; Seidcal also owns 
75% of SAL II; and Charisma Partners, L.P. owns 54.55% of 
Federal. IBSF argues that the Committee was obligated to 
file Schedule 13D information for Seidcal as a "person 
controlling" SAL and SAL II, and for Charisma as a "person 
controlling" Federal. IBSF further argues that the 
Committee was obligated to file Schedule 13D information 
about 8th Floor and Kevin Moore because, in IBSF 's view, 
each of them is also a "person controlling" Federal. 
 
As described above, Seidman is the "managing member" 
of SAL, the "manager" of SAL II, and the "investment 
manager" of Federal. However, the operating agreements of 
each of these three companies give others the power to 
remove him: Seidman may be removed from his positions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(4) "Purpose of Transaction"; (5) "Interest in Securities of the Issuer"; 
(6) 
"Contracts, Arrangements, Understandings or Relationships with Respect 
to Securities of the Issuer"; and (7) "Material to be Filed as Exhibits." 
17 
C.F.R. S 240.13d-101. 
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at, respectively, SAL and SAL II by a majority in interest of 
the members of those companies; and Seidman may be 
removed from his position at Federal by Moore, Federal's 
administrative manager (for cause before June 13, 1997, 
and without cause thereafter). 
 
IBSF argues that Seidcal is a "person controlling" SAL 
and SAL II by virtue of its majority ownership interest in 
these companies; the defendants argue that only Seidman, 
as manager or managing member, is a "person controlling" 
these companies. Similarly, IBSF argues that Charisma, 
8th Floor, and Moore are all "person[s] controlling" Federal, 
while the defendants argue that only Seidman is a"person 
controlling" Federal. The district court's analysis of this 
question concluded that only Seidman is a "person 
controlling" SAL, SAL II and Federal because, in practice, 
only he has exercised actual control over these companies. 
We disagree. 
 
The SEC has defined "control" as the term is used in 
"forms for statements and reports" filed pursuant to section 
13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 -- forms such as 
Schedule 13D -- as follows: 
 
       The term "control" (including the terms "controlling," 
       "controlled by" and "under common control with") 
       means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power 
       to direct or cause the direction of the management and 
       policies of a person, whether through the ownership of 
       voting securities, by contract, or otherwise. 
 
17 C.F.R. S 240.12b-2. Because the definition of "control" in 
S 240.12b-2 directs the court to look to "the power to direct 
or cause the direction of the management and policies of a 
person," Seidman's actual control of SAL, SAL II, and 
Federal does not preclude a finding that Seidman's control 
is shared with others if others have the power to direct the 
management and policies of these companies.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This court has previously construed the term "controlling person" as 
the term is used in Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. S 78t(a), which under certain circumstances imposes secondary 
liability on those who control violators of the securities laws. In Rochez 
Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975), this court quoted 
the definition of "control" in 17 C.F.R.S 240.12b-2 and then said: 
 
                                11 
  
The operating agreements of SAL and SAL II give the 
"majority in interest of the Members" -- i.e., Seidcal -- 
power to remove Seidman as manager or managing 
member. Seidcal also has the power to carry on and 
manage all decisions, consents, authorizations and rights 
in connection with the business and affairs of both 
companies. These two sources of authority mean that 
Seidcal has had and continues to have "the power to direct 
or cause the direction of the management and policies" of 
SAL and SAL II, notwithstanding that Seidcal has refrained 
from, and may continue to refrain from, exercising that 
power. Seidcal is therefore a "person controlling" SAL and 
SAL II, and the Committee's Schedule 13D statement 
should, therefore, have included the information in items 2- 
6 regarding Seidcal. 
 
The operating agreement of Federal is somewhat 
different. Kevin Moore, the administrative manager, has 
authority to remove Seidman as investment manager and 
also has authority over "all other decisions, consents, 
authorizations and rights in connection with the 
management of the Company." Moore therefore has"the 
power to direct or cause the direction of the management 
and policies" of Federal, and hence is a "person controlling" 
Federal for whom Schedule 13D information should have 
been reported. 
 
The Federal operating agreement puts all administrative 
powers in the hands of Moore, and makes no provision for 
his removal as administrative manager; the operating 
agreement does not in explicit terms vest any authority in 
Charisma or its sole general partner, 8th Floor, of which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
        Many factors are involved in determining if one is a "controlling 
       person." In making this determination, the courts have given heavy 
       consideration to the power or potential power to influence and 
       control the activities of a person, as opposed to the actual 
exercise 
       thereof. 
 
Id. at 890-91. There is no apparent reason for the term "controlling 
person," as it is used in section 20(a), to be more broadly construed than 
the term "person controlling," as it is used in Instruction C to Schedule 
13D. 
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Moore is vice-president. At oral argument in this court, 
counsel for IBSF acknowledged that its contention that 
Charisma and 8th Floor must file Schedule 13D 
information rests on an inference that, in his post as 
administrative manager of Federal, Moore represents the 
interests of 8th Floor and Charisma. We are unwilling to 
draw such an inference in the absence of any formal legal 
authority for 8th Floor or Charisma to direct Moore's 
decisions with respect to Federal. Accordingly, we conclude 
that the Committee was under no obligation to file 
information regarding Charisma or 8th Floor in its 
Schedule 13D statement. 
 
IV. Was the IBSF board entitled to reject the Committee's 
       nominees? 
 
As noted above, the district court ordered IBSF to place 
the Committee's two nominees on the 1996 ballot for two 
reasons. First, the district court held that IBSF was 
equitably estopped from rejecting the Committee's 
nominations, because it had accepted substantially similar 
nominations the year before. Second, the district court 
found that IBSF would not be prejudiced by being required 
to accept the nominations. We find neither reason 
persuasive. 
 
New Jersey's Supreme Court has defined equitable 
estoppel as follows: 
 
       `the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby 
       he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, 
       from asserting rights which might perhaps have 
       otherwise existed . . . as against another person, who 
       has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has 
       been led thereby to change his position for the worse 
       . . . .' 
 
W.V. Pangborne & Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of 
Transportation, 562 A.2d 222, 227 (N.J. 1989) (quoting 
Carlsen v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan Trust, 403 
A.2d 880, 882 (N.J. 1979)) (alterations in original).4 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The district court applied New Jersey law to determine whether IBSF 
was equitably estopped from rejecting the Committee's nominees. As no 
party contests the application of New Jersey law and IBSF is a New 
Jersey corporation, we follow the district court and look to New Jersey 
law to determine whether IBSF is equitably estopped from rejecting the 
Committee's nominees. 
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court has added that "[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is 
applied `only in very compelling circumstances,'`where the 
interests of justice, morality and common fairness clearly 
dictate that course.' " Palatine I v. Planning Board, 628 A.2d 
321, 328 (N.J. 1993) (quoting Timber Products, Inc. v. 
Chester Township, 500 A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1984), and Gruber v. Mayor of Raritan Township, 186 
A.2d 489, 495 (N.J. 1962). 
 
The district court's invocation of the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel took as its premise that "IBSF's approval of the 
Committee's substantially similar submissions [in 1995] no 
doubt influenced the content and timing of the Committee's 
current submissions." That being so, the district court felt 
it would be " `unjust' " to "allow the board's changed 
interpretation of its Certificate of Incorporation to work 
prejudice to defendants' nomination." We see no injustice 
here. Whatever basis the Committee may have had for 
relying on IBSF 's acceptance of the 1995 submissions 
necessarily vanished when the Committee was placed on 
notice of IBSF 's dissatisfaction in 1996. A situation in 
which the Committee had eight days to cure the announced 
deficiencies and elected not to do so hardly rises to the level 
of " `very compelling circumstances,' `where the interests of 
justice, morality and common fairness clearly dictate' " that 
IBSF not be permitted to bar the Committee's nominations. 
 
Moreover, the district court's determination that IBSF 
would not be prejudiced by a requirement that it accept the 
Committee's nominees, while perhaps correct as a factual 
matter, is irrelevant as a legal matter. The Certificate of 
Incorporation gives the board the discretion to reject 
nominations if the nominees do not provide specified 
information, after notice, within the time given to cure. "The 
certificate of incorporation . . . constitute[s] a contract 
between the corporation and its stockholders and the 
stockholders inter sese." Faunce v. Boost Co., 83 A.2d 649, 
651 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1951). This is not a case in 
which a provision of the certificate of incorporation offends 
public policy and therefore may not be enforced. See, e.g., 
New Jersey v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 178 A.2d 329, 
338-39 (N.J. 1962). Article 9.3 -- which provides notice and 
an opportunity to cure before a nomination is rejected -- is 
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reasonable on its face. Mere absence of prejudice to the 
corporation does not empower a court to veto a board of 
directors' exercise of a discretionary authority vested in the 
board by the certificate of incorporation.5 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the IBSF board was acting 
within its authority in declining to accept the nominations 
of the Committee for failure to comply with the provisions 
of Article 9.3 of IBSF's certificate of incorporation. 
 
V. Was the IBSF board entitled to reduce the board size 
       from seven to six? 
 
The district court determined that a New Jersey court 
would measure the propriety of the board's action under 
the standard set forth by Delaware courts in Blasius v. 
Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), and subsequent 
cases. Blasius requires that a board's action primarily 
motivated by a desire to frustrate shareholder franchise be 
justified by a compelling interest. In Blasius, Chancellor 
Allen justified heightened scrutiny for board action that 
dilutes the effectiveness of the shareholder vote because: 
 
       [The shareholder franchise] is critical to the theory that 
       legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors 
       and officers) over vast aggregations of property that 
       they do not own. Thus, when viewed from a broad 
       institutional perspective, it can be seen that matters 
       involving the integrity of the shareholder voting process 
       involve considerations not present in any other context 
       in which directors exercise delegated power. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In relying on the absence of prejudice to IBSF, the district court 
cited 
cases in which a corporate board asked a court to exercise the court's 
judicial discretion to enjoin proxy solicitations. See Cook United, Inc. 
v. 
Stockholders Protective Committee of Cook United, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
P 96,875, 1979 WL 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp. v. Lewis, 334 F. Supp. 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Although it may well 
be appropriate for a court to decline to enjoin a proxy contest for 
failure 
to comply with SEC rules where such failure has not demonstrably 
prejudiced the moving party, this case is different. Here, the court is 
not 
making an original determination whether to enjoin a proxy contest, but 
is reviewing actions of the board that are properly within the board's 
purview. 
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Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. 
 
The district court found that the board's primary 
motivation in reducing the number of board seats was to 
hinder the Committee's attempts to gain a voice on the 
board and held that, under Blasius, board action taken for 
such a purpose was invalid. IBSF (1) objects to the district 
court's importation of Blasius into New Jersey law and (2) 
contends that even under the Blasius standard, as that 
standard has been further refined by Delaware courts, the 
board's action was valid. 
 
IBSF argues that because New Jersey's business 
judgment rule, as codified at N.J.S.A. 14A:6-1 6 & 6-14,7 
differs significantly from Delaware's, New Jersey courts 
would not look to Delaware to inform their application of 
the business judgment rule. IBSF is correct that, unlike 
Delaware, New Jersey has chosen not to apply heightened 
scrutiny to director action taken in defense against a 
proposed acquisition. N.J.S.A. 14A:6-1(3) states that when 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. N.J.S.A. 14A:6-1 provides in relevant part that: 
 
       (3) If . . . the board of directors determines that any proposal or 
offer 
       to acquire the corporation is not in the best interest of the 
       corporation, it may reject such proposal or offer. If the board of 
       directors determines to reject any such proposal or offer, the 
board 
       of directors shall have no obligation to facilitate, remove any 
barriers 
       to, or refrain from impeding the proposal or offer. 
 
7. N.J.S.A. 14A:6-14 provides in relevant part that: 
 
       (1) Directors and members of any committee designated by the 
       board shall discharge their duties in good faith and with that 
degree 
       of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent people would 
       exercise under similar circumstances in like positions. 
 
       . . . 
 
       (4) In taking action, including, without limitation, action which 
may 
       involve or relate to a change or potential change in the control of 
the 
       corporation, a director shall be entitled to consider, without 
       limitation, both the long-term and the short-term interests of the 
       corporation and its shareholders. For the purpose of this 
       subsection, "control" means the possession, directly or indirectly, 
of 
       the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and 
       policies of the corporation, whether through the ownership of 
voting 
       shares, by contract or otherwise. 
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faced with "any proposal or offer to acquire the corporation 
. . . the board of directors shall have no obligation to 
facilitate, remove any barriers to, or refrain from impeding 
the proposal or offer." Cf. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)(requiring the directors' 
response to a hostile tender offer to be proportionate to the 
threat posed). In this case, however, IBSF was not faced 
with a "proposal or offer to acquire the corporation," so 
N.J.S.A. 14A:6-1(3) does not insulate the board's action 
from judicial scrutiny. 
 
Neither the briefs of the parties, nor our researches, have 
identified New Jersey cases which have addressed the level 
of scrutiny to be applied to action by a board of directors 
intended to hamper the exercise by some shareholders of 
their franchise. Given the absence of pertinent New Jersey 
case law, the district court was, in our judgment, correct in 
concluding that New Jersey courts confronted with a case 
like the case at bar would look to Delaware case law. When 
faced with novel issues of corporate law, New Jersey courts 
have often looked to Delaware's rich abundance of 
corporate law for guidance. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. 
Co. Derivative Litigation, 659 A.2d 961, 968-69 (N.J. Super. 
App. Div. 1995)("Delaware is recognized as a pacesetter in 
the area of corporate law."); Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 
683 A.2d 818, 829 (N.J. 1996)(citing Delaware law for the 
importance of distinguishing between individual and 
derivative actions); Pogostin v. Leighton, 523 A.2d 1078 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.)("As the issue involved herein is 
one of corporate law, an appropriate source of reference is 
the law of Delaware."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987). 
 
We believe that it is likely that a New Jersey court would 
again follow Delaware law in this case, especially because 
New Jersey shares Delaware's interest in providing 
significant protection to a shareholder's right to vote. In 
Penn-Texas Corp. v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 112 A.2d 302, 
307 (N.J. Ch. 1955), the court found that the postponement 
of an annual meeting by unilateral action of the board of 
directors constituted an infringement of the shareholders' 
right to vote sufficient to invoke intervention by the court. 
Penn-Texas cited Faunce v. Boost Co., 83 A.2d 649 (N.J. Ch. 
1951), where the court characterized the right to vote as a 
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"basic contractual right" and "an incident to membership or 
of the property in the stock, of which the stockholder or 
member cannot be deprived without his consent." Id. at 
652. In light of the protection that New Jersey law has 
provided to shareholder voting rights, the district court was 
not in error in finding that New Jersey courts would look to 
Blasius to assess the propriety of the board's reduction in 
size. 
 
IBSF also contends, however, that the district court erred 
in applying Blasius to this case because: 1) the district 
court erred in finding that the board's primary motivation 
in reducing its size was to hinder the Committee's proxy 
solicitation; and 2) Blasius applies only where the franchise 
process has been engaged in a challenge for control of a 
company and in the present case the franchise process had 
not been engaged nor could the Committee have gained 
control of IBSF. Analysis of these contentions requires 
review of a factual finding by the district court as well as 
characterization of Blasius itself. 
 
In challenging the district court's finding that the board's 
elimination of an open seat was primarily intended to 
impede the Committee's attempts to gain a voice on the 
board, IBSF urges that the district court improperly 
disregarded the directors' other reasons for reducing board 
size -- 1) flexibility to add board members in case of an 
acquisition, and 2) efficiency. IBSF does not dispute that 
the directors were motivated at least in part by a desire to 
prevent the Committee from being able to gain two seats on 
the board.8 The district court found that the efficiency and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. As the district court noted, the chairman of IBSF's board, Joseph M. 
Ochman, Sr., gave deposition testimony that "[i]n the event there was 
any proxy contest, [it would be] in the best interest[s] of all 
shareholders 
to have only one nominee for directorship rather than two." R. at 302a. 
Later in his deposition, Ochman linked the best interests of the 
shareholders to the defeat of the proposal urged by the Committee, 
stating that: 
 
       [T]he dissident group of shareholders were advocating very clearly 
in 
       their material and press releases that we should hire an investment 
       banker and put the company up for sale through an auction. The 
       board believed then and firmly believes today that it is absolutely 
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flexibility rationales were pretextual in light of the ability of 
the board to accommodate up to fifteen members in the 
event of an acquisition, and the lack of documentation of 
discussions of flexibility or efficiency gains from a reduction 
in board size at prior board meetings.9  IBS Financial Corp., 
954 F. Supp. at 985. This court is not convinced that the 
district court was clearly in error in determining that, of the 
three rationales, the desire to foreclose the Committee from 
electing two directors was paramount. To the contrary, the 
district court's finding appears to us to have substantial 
support in the record. 
 
IBSF argues that even if the board was primarily 
motivated by a desire to prevent the Committee from 
gaining two seats on the board, the board's action does not 
fall within the Blasius rubric because at the time the board 
reduced its size there was no chance that the Committee 
could take control of the board. The district court rejected 
the argument that a contest must be for outright control of 
the board in order to trigger Blasius, reasoning that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       not in the best interest of all our shareholders and that long 
range, 
       that we can build the franchise, develop the company further, and 
       maximize the shareholder value. 
 
Id. 
 
Furthermore, another IBSF director, Thomas J. Auchter, testified on 
deposition that one of the reasons discussed by the board for reducing 
the board size was that the reduction "would make it more difficult for 
Mr. Seidman to gain control of IBSF." R. at 293a. 
 
9. The district court also found that the board of Interboro (IBSF's 
operating subsidiary) remained unchanged, at seven directors, and that, 
in the event of an acquisition, new members would have to be added to 
that board. The district court further observed that the efficiency and 
flexibility rationales were dubious because they"arose for the first time 
in depositions taken after the Court alerted the parties to the viability 
and case law applicable to [the claim for reinstatement of the second 
open director seat]." However, in response to IBSF's motion to correct or 
modify the record, the district court revised its findings of fact to 
read: 
 
       Each rationale arose for the first time in depositions taken after 
the 
       litigation had commenced and in all but one instance after the 
       Court alerted the parties to the viability of and case law 
applicable 
       to defendants' first counterclaim. 
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anticipated 1996 election represented a step towards 
control of the board by the Committee.10  We agree. 
 
Blasius dictates that actions taken for the purpose of 
interfering with the shareholder franchise must be 
supported by compelling justification. The board did not 
establish a compelling justification in the district court and 
does not urge such a justification in this appeal. Because 
we uphold the district court's finding that the board 
reduced its size in order to frustrate the Committee's 
attempt to gain a substantial presence on the board, and 
because the board has not articulated a compelling 
justification for its action, the district court's invalidation of 
the reduction in the board will be sustained. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. IBSF 's attempts to characterize Blasius and the cases following it as 
requiring that the proxy process be "engaged" are also unsuccessful. We 
read the cases cited by IBSF in support of an "engagement" requirement 
as allowing Delaware courts to consider the degree to which the proxy 
process has been invoked in determining whether action taken by a 
board is primarily motivated by a desire to impair the shareholder 
franchise. See, e.g., Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. 
1990)(denying preliminary injunctive relief because"while postponement 
of a noticed meeting will in some circumstances constitute an 
inequitable manipulation, I can in no event see that the franchise 
process can be said to be sufficiently engaged before the fixing of this 
meeting date to give rise to that possibility"); Dolgoff v. 
Projectavision, 
1996 WL 91945 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 1996)(denying preliminary injunctive 
relief where an annual meeting was scheduled in conformance with the 
corporation's bylaws and where there was no reason to believe a proxy 
contest was at hand because these facts indicated that the board's 
action in scheduling the meeting early in the year was not intended to 
thwart the exercise of the shareholder franchise); Kidsco v. Dinsmore, 
674 A.2d 483 (Del. Ch. 1995)(citing Stahl for the proposition that "the 
franchise process [cannot] be said to be sufficiently engaged before the 
fixing of the meeting date to give rise to . . . .[the possibility of 
inequitable manipulation]." None of these cases establishes a hard line 
rule that a proxy contest must be engaged in order for Blasius to apply. 
In the case at bar, it was, as noted supra, generally expected, following 
the Committee's failure to elect directors of its choice in December 1995, 
that the Committee would resume its campaign in 1996; thus when the 
board acted, in the summer of 1996, to eliminate the Lockhart seat as 
of the 1996 election, the proxy contest process had, realistically, been 
"engaged" ever since the fall of 1995. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
In sum, we (1) disagree with the district court's ruling 
that the Committee's Schedule 13D statement was 
complete, and (2) disagree with the district court's ruling 
that the IBSF board was equitably estopped from rejecting 
the Committee's nominee, but (3) agree with the district 
court's ruling that the IBSF board's reduction of the size of 
the board from seven to six was improper. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the district court as it relates to issues (1) and 
(2) is reversed, and the judgment of the district court as it 
relates to issue (3) is affirmed, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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